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THE JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC
SECTOR INTEREST ARBITRATION
CHARLES B. CRAVER*
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Federal Government and the vast majority of states
have legislatively provided various public employees' with the right to or-
ganize for the purpose of negotiating with their respective governmental
employers concerning-
 their wages, hours, and working conditions. Where a
public employer and the designated bargaining representative of its
employees are able to mutually agree upon the terms of employment to be
included in a new collective contract, few difficulties are encountered. How-
ever, where such parties are themselves unable to achieve a satisfactory ac-
commodation of their competing interests, the intervention of outside neutrals
may be utilized, to assist them with the resolution of their negotiating impasse.
The services of a labor mediator may effectively encourage the parties to
reach an agreement, or a fact-finder may be employed to recommend the
mariner in which the unresolved bargaining issues should be settled. 2
Nonetheless, resort to such ancillary procedures may occasionally prove inef-
fective, thus leaving the parties without a satisfactory resolution of their dis-
pute.
The impasse resolution technique most often used in the private sector
where parties are unable to resolve a bargaining impasse through regular
negotiations involves resort to a work stoppage. Although eight states have
legislatively sanctioned -this economic weapon for at least some groups of gov-
ernmental employees under certain circumstances, 3 most have either statuto-
rily proscribed such conduct' or prohibited such stoppages by judicial deci-
sion.' As a result, most public employees are unable to lawfully enhance
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.S., 1967, Cornell Univer-
sity; M. lrid. & Labor Rel., 1968, Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor
Relations; J.D., 1971, University of Michigan.
' Although many state labor enactments generally cover all state and local
public employees, subject to certain limited exclusions, other statutes only apply to
particular groups of workers, such as police personnel, firelighters, or educational
employees. See citations at note 10 infra.
2 See generally H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK & C, CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN
THE PUBLIC SEcToR 593-606 (1979) [hereinafter cited as H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK & C.
CRAVER] and authorities cited therein.
See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp.
1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.64 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 41-2209
(Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003
(Purdon Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 11 1.70(4)(cm)(6)(c) (Supp. 1978).
4 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit, 19, § 1312 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-
4333(c)(5) (1977).
5 See, e.g., Anderson Fedi] of Teachers, Local 519 v. School City of Ander-
son, 252 Ind. 558, 254 N.E.2d 329, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970); Board of Educ. of
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their position during a bargaining impasse through the application of
economic self-help measures.
Many states have realistically recognized that the mere prohibition of
work stoppages by public employees will not ipso facto prevent such occur-
rences. Where frustration over unsuccessful negotiations becomes sufficiently
extreme, governmental workers may simply ignore the applicable legal pro-
scription and engage in strike activities.' In an effort to minimize such dis-
ruptions of governmental services, numerous states have elected to provide an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism.' The most common public sector
device for resolving bargaining disputes where mediation and fact-finding
have proved unsuccessful entails the use of binding "interest" arbitration. 8
Twenty-seven states currently" authorize the use of voluntary (i.e., by
consent of parties) or compulsory interest arbitration to resolve ultimately
some or all public sector negotiation impasses.'"
Kankakee School Dist. No, I 1 1 v. Kankakee Fecl'n of Teachers, Local 886, 46 III. 2d
439, 264 N.E.2d 18 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
Regarding the extent of public sector strike activity during the past two
decades, see H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK & C. CRAVER, supra note 2, at 493 & Table 1.
7 See Barr, The Public Arbitration Panel a,s an Administrative Agency: Can Compul-
sory Interest Arbitration be an Acceptable Dispute Resolution Method in the Public Sector?, 39
ALBANY L. Rev. 377, 378 (1975); Note, Fiiad Offer Arbitration: The Last Word in Public.
Sector Disputes, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. - PRoa. 525 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Columbia
Note]; Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 64 CAL. L. Rev. 678
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Grodin].
" "Interest" arbitration is distinguished from the more familiar grievance or
"rights" arbitration by the fact that in the fOrmer situation the designated neutral is
employed to determine the actual contract terms which will bind the parties during the
life of their new agreement, while in the latter situation the arbitrator is only empow-
ered to decide disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the terms of
an already existing contract. The grievance arbiter is generally precluded from adding
lo or modifying the terms of the contract in dispute. See. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS 47-50 (1973).
Interest arbitration provisions enacted in South Dakota, S.D. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 9-14A (Supp. 1978), and Utah, UTAH CODE. ANN. § 34-20a-7 (Supp. 1978),
were previously declared unconstitutional. See City of Sioux Falls v. Firefighters Local
814, 89 S.D. 455, 234 N.W.2d 35 (1925); Salt Lake City v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters,
563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977). Regarding the constitutionality of public sector interest
arbitration legislation, sec discussion in Part II infra.
1" ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972) (police officers, firefighters, jail and cor-
rectional institution personnel, and hospital workers); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473
(Supp. 1978) (local government employees); DEL. Cone ANN. tit. 19, § 1310 (1975)
(state and local workers); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-11 (Supp. 1978) (state and local
employees); Ill. Dir. of Personnel Rules and Regulations § 15, CCH PER 1116,069 (state
personnel); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-4-12 (Burns Supp. 1978) (state and local workers);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 90.15 (Supp. 1978) (firefighters); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (Supp.
1978) (state and local workers); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(4) (Supp. 1978-79)
(local government workers); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-D(4) (1964) (state
employees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1026(4) (Supp. 1978-79) (university person-
nel); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 9 (Supp. 1978-79) (state and local employees);
MICR. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.231-.240 (Supp. 1978-79) (police and firefighters);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.38 (Supp. 1978) (hospital workers); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
179.72 (Supp. 1978) (essential employees); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1614(9)
(Supp. 1978) (state and local personnel); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-810 to -819 (Supp.
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The arbitral procedures followed vary widely from state to state.'' In
some cases, a single neutral arbitrator or a state administrative agency is
employed to decide the issues in dispute, while in other cases a tripartite ar-
bitration panel consisting of a management representative, a labor representa-
tive, and a, neutral chairperson is used." Arbitrators may be authorized to
formulate any final resolution of the unresolved matters which they believe is
appropriate,' 3 or they may simply be empowered to select the most reasonable
final offer made by one of the parties, either on an "issue-by-issue" basis K or
1978) (state and local personnel); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.200 (1975) (local government
employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27S-A-12 (Supp. 1978) (state and local workers);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-7 (1965) (state and local personnel); N.M. State Personnel
Bd. Regulations § 14(c), CCH PEB 1f24,519 (state employees); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §
205.3 (Stipp. 1978-79) (police and firefighters); OKLA. STAT. ANN, III. 11, § 548.1
(Supp. 1978-79) (police and firefighters); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.712(2)(c) (1975) (state
and local personnel); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.742 (1975) (police, firefighters, and guards
at mental and correctional 1IISCID.160110; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.4 (Purdon Supp.
1978-79) (police and firelighters); PA. STAT. ANN. tit, 43, §§ 1101.804-.805 (Purdon
Supp. 1978-79) (state and local personnel); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-7 (1968)
(firefighters); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.2-7 (1968) (police); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.3-9
(1968) (teachers); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.4-10 (Supp. 1978) (municipal workers); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 28-9.5-9 (Supp. 1978) (school administrators); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-11-9
(Supp. 1978) (state employees); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5154C-9 to -15 (Ver-
non Supp. 1978-79) (police and firefighters); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 925 (Supp. 1978)
(state workers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1733 (Supp. 1978) (local government
employees); WASH. Rev. CODE ANN. 41.56.450 (Supp. 1978) (police and firefighters);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(cm) (Supp. 1978) (municipal employees); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.70(4)(jm) (1974) (Milwaukee police); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111,77 (1974) (non-
Milwaukee police and firefighters); Wyo. STAT. § 27-269 (1967) (firefighters).
" Procedural variations within the same state may even occur where the ena-
bling statute authorizes negotiating parties to establish their own mutually acceptable
arbitration procedures. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-11(b) (Supp. 1978).
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. 27-270 (1967), which provides that for firefighter interest
arbin-ation each party shall select an arbitrator, with these two individuals being given
ten clays to agree upon the third neutral arbiter. If these two people are unable to
agree upon the neutral chair, either party may petition the district. court to have it
designate the neutral member.
12 See generally ARBITRATION OF INTEREST DISPUTES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1-61 (B. Den-
nis S.: C. Somers eds. 1974); Morris, The Role of Interest Arbitration in a Collective Bargain-
ing System, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 427, 464-66 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Morris); McAvoy,
Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the
Public Sector, 72 Coium. L. REV. 1192 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McAvoy]; J. STERN,
C. REHMUS, J. LOEWENBERG, H. KASPER & B. DENNIS, FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION (1975)
[hereinafter cited as J. STERN ET AL.]; Comment, Public Sector Interest Arbitration: Threat
to Local Representative Government?, 9 PActFic L.J. 165, 183-84 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Comment].
'" See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.804-.805 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79).
14 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.231-.240 (Supp. 1978-79). See also
IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (Supp. 1978) which directs the arbitration panel to make an
issue-by-issue determination from among not only the final offers of the disputing
parties but also from the previously issued recommendations of the fact-finder. Re-
garding the appropriate definition of the term "issue," see West Des Moines Educ.
Ass'n v. PERB, 266 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1978).
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on a "total package" basis.'s The arbitration award may be entirely binding
upon the parties," completely advisory," or partially binding and partially
advisory depending upon the state statute and the specific issues involved."
As state legislatures have increasingly accepted interest arbitration as a
viable means to finally resolve public sector bargaining impasses, some people
have questioned the propriety of this dispute resolution procedure. It has
been contended that the availability of such arbitration may actually weaken
the bargaining process by encouraging parties to rely upon the arbitral alter-
native as a substitute for meaningful negotiations." Some have even ques-
tioned the efficacy of this device as a strike deterrent. 20 Critics have also
argued that interest arbitration provisions inappropriately delegate to politi-
cally unaccountable private arbiters the ultimate authority to determine im-
portant employment issues which could profoundly affect the services re-
ceived by the public and the manner in which governmental revenues are to
be expended. 2 '
Although it is not the purpose of this article to engage in any significant
discussion of these criticisms of public sector interest arbitration, some obser-
vations should be briefly noted. The empirical results from those jurisdictions
which have adopted this device as a means of resolving bargaining impasses
demonstrate that this procedure has actually diminished strike activity. 22
Furthermore, there has been no indication that this option has had any per-
nicious impact upon the bargaining process. 23 Nonetheless, it must be recog-
nized that this device has undoubtedly influenced governmental institutions
by imposing upon municipal entities employment terms which were not con-
sensually accepted by the elected representatives.
It is unlikely that meaningful negotiating rights can be extended to gov-
ernmental employees without impacting the political process to some extent.
An effect upon the political system, however, need not be grounds for defeat-
ing labor legislation.24 Even where no formal bargaining rights are granted
15 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111,70(4)(cm) (Supp. 1978). For au excellent
comparison of the experiences under the Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin arbi-
tration statutes, see J. STERN ET AL., supra note 12.
'' See, e.g.. R.1
. GEN. LAWS §§, 28-9.1-9; & 28-9.2-9 (1968).
" See, e.g.. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153f (Stipp. 1978). Such "advisory
arbitration" is basically analogous to fact-finding.
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-0(4)(D) (Supp. 1978-79) (opin-
ion advisory regarding wages, pensions, and insurance, but binding with respect to
other matters); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.805 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79) (award
advisory only, where legislative action required to implement it). See also OKLA. STAT.
ANN. Ill. 11, § 548.9 (Supp. 1978-79) (award binding if accepted by public employer,
but not if rejected by it).
1 " See, e.g., NIcAvoy, supra note 12, at 1209-10 and authorities cited therein.
" See, e.g., id. at 1210-11 and authorities cited therein.
21
 See generally Grodin, supra note 7; see also McAvoy, supra note 12, at 1208-
09; Comment, supra note 12, at 165-66.
22 See Howlett, Contract Negotiation Arbitration in the Public Sector, 42 CIN. L.
Rt:v. 47, 64 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Howlett]; J. STERN ET Al.., supra note 12, at 32,
71; Comment. supra note 12, at 169 n.19.
23 See Howlett, supra note 22, at 57-61.
24 See, e.g., R. SUMMERS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PUBLIC BENEFIT CONFER -
RAL: A JURISPRUDENTIAL CRrriquE (1976).
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to public employees, the employees can significantly influence the political
process through the use of lobbying efforts. Moreover, notwithstanding any
distortion in the political process which may result from the extension of labor
negotiation rights, the extension remains appropriate to enhance workers'
personal dignity and to provide them a formal process for participating in the
determination of their employment conditions. Interest arbitration is a useful
bargaining dispute resolution technique which is appropriate where suitable
substantive and procedural safeguards are provided. Thus, while public policy
should not automatically preclude the acceptance of such arbitration, neither
should it be ignored in determining the proper parameters of an interest ar-
bitration scheme. 25
The primary objective of this article is not to debate the policy considera-
tions underlying a legislative decision to enact a public sector interest arbitra-
tion provision, 2" but rather to analyze the manner in which judicial tribunals
resolve the fundamental legal issues which arise under established arbitral
statutes. The two most litigated questions concern the constitutional propriety
of such legislative delegations of governmental authority and the appropriate
scope of judicial review to be applied to awards issued by arbitrators pursuant
to such statutory schemes. The constitutional questions will be evaluated first,
with the proper standards for judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards being
explored thereafter.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Numerous constitutional challenges to public sector interest arbitration
statutes have been made. The most frequently litigated issue and the one en-
gendering the most intricate judicial scrutiny has concerned the assertion that
such enactments constitute impermissible delegations of legislative authority to
politically unaccountable private individuals. However, various other constitu-
tional claims have also been raised. Although they have usually been expedi-
tiously disposed of by judicial tribunals, they are deserving of at least brief
consideration.
A. Non-Delegation Challenges
Five distinct. non-delegation theories have been relied upon by parties
questioning the constitutional validity of interest arbitration statutes. Public
employers have contended that such enactments contravene due process and
25
 The alternative to an arbitral dispute settlement procedure is not in-
frequently resort to strike action, and it must he emphasized that the distortion of the
political process which can he achieved through such conduct could easily transcend
that which may be indigenous to an interest arbitration scheme. See H. WELLIN.GTON &
R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 167-69 (1971).
26
 This is not intended to denigrate the importance of such basic policy con-
siderations. It must he acknowledged that this involves an issue over which reasonable
people can disagree and, as has already been indicated, I simply accept the philosophi-
cal notion that a properly circumscribed public sector interest arbitration scheme can
constitute an appropriate impasse resolution device.
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equal protection principles, the one-mall-one-vote doctrine, home rule au-
thorizations, and governmental taxing power. 27
In Harney v. Russo," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was presented with
the argument that a state interest arbitration statute unconstitutionally permit-
ted arbitrators to ignore due process standards. The court recognized that
such a contention assumed that procedural safeguards would generally not be
satisfied. It appropriately indicated that the possibility of such an impropriety
in a specific case could not taint the statutory scheme itself, but only the re-
sults of the improperly conducted proceeding." Since the availability of judi-
cial review would presumably prevent the enforcement of awards emanating
from hearings conducted in an arbitrary or unfair manner, there would be no
reason to sustain such a challenge to the entire underlying enactment."
Statutes authorizing arbitration of bargaining disputes for only specific
groups of public employees have been challenged as being violative of equal
protection rules. Courts, however, have had no difficulty in concluding that
such legislative distinctions are completely permissible since they are sup-
ported by rational considerations." So long as the elected representatives are
not making wholly illogical demarcations, the fact that a provision applies to
certain government workers but not to others should be irrelevant. 32
Litigants have contended that interest arbitration enactments are uncon-
stitutional since they authorize the performance of quasi-legislative functions
by private arbiters who have not been selected in conformity with the one-
man-one-vote doctrine. Nonetheless, this argument has been summarily re-
jected by courts. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Harney, "the
mere fact that the arbitration panel ... could affect the spending of public
funds is clearly not sufficient to make that body legislative and thus subject to
" See generally Weisberger, Constitutionality of Compulsory Public Sector Interest
Arbitration Legislation: A 1976 Perspective in LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SEC-
TOR 35 (A. Knapp ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Weisberger]; Note, Legality and Pro-
priety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor Disputes in Public Employment, 54 CORNELL
L. REV. 129, 137-43 (1968).
A writer has even suggested that an interest arbitration provision may impermissi-
bly breach the separation of powers concept by enmeshing the judicial branch in legis-
lative decision-making through the power of courts to review and enforce arbitral
awards. See Note, Binding Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector: Is It Constitutional?, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 816-17 (1977). Such an argument ignores the fact that the
judicial review of such quasi-legislative awards is really no different from that tradi-
tionally exercised over administrative agencies when they perform similar quasi-
legislative functions.
28
 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969).
29
 435 Pa. at 192-93, 255 A.2d at 565.
39 Cf Mount St. Mary's Hospital v. CatherwOod, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N.E.2d
508 (1970) (upholding binding interest arbitration law for non-profit hospitals). See
Morris, supra note 12, at 817-18.
3 ' See City of Everett v. Fire Fighters, 87 Wash. 2c1 572, 555 P.2d 418 (1976);
Illinois Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 73 v. City of Waukegan, 37 III. 2d 423, 226
N.E.2d 606 (1967).
32 cf. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) and authorities cited therein (sus-
taining age 60 retirement mandate for Foreign Service personnel).
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the one man, one vote principle." 33 Thus, the courts have refused to
acknowledge the notion that statutorily appointed arbiters are "unelected rep-
resentatives" without authority to appropriate public monies.
Judicial tribunals have similarly dismissed assertions that interest arbitra-
tion schemes enacted by state legislatures conflict with home rule provisions in
state constitutions delegating authority over local matters to municipal entities.
However, such constitutional limitations usually include specific exceptions for
legislative enactments of general, as opposed to limited, applicability. Thus,
courts have uniformly sustained statutes that have provided for state-wide
coverage, despite the resulting impact of such laws upon local governments."
The final non-delegation challenge to interest arbitration statutes has
concerned the effect such enactments have upon the taxing power of
municipalities. It has been argued that such laws impermissibly provide arbi-
trators with the capacity to regulate taxes, a matter within the exclusive do-
main of elected representatives. This claim has been rejected, since no taxing
authority is actually transferred by such statutes to arbitrators. While an arbi-
tral decision may provide the impetus for a reconsideration of the existing tax
structure, any change will appropriately be effectuated by elected officials and
not by the arbitrator. 35 It has similarly been recognized that the legislative
enactment of an interest arbitration provision does not usurp the taxing au-
thority vested in local governments. As the Supreme Court of Washington
noted, "although [such a law] may result in the need for local taxation, it does
not itself impose any [tax]." 36
B. Delegation Challenges
The most consequential challenge to public sector interest arbitration stat-
utes has involved the contention that such laws impermissibly delegate legisla-
tive authority to politically unaccountable arbitrators. Although the majority
of judicial decisions considering this argument have found it unpersuasive, it
has frequently precipitated strongly divergent opinions. 37
as
	 v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 192, 255 A.2d 560, 564 (1969). Accord, City
of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290 (1975); Town of Arlington v.
Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976).
" See City of Everett v. Fire Fighters, 87 Wash. 2d 572, 555 P.2d 418 (1976);
Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d
914 (1976); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19. 332 N.E.2d 290 (1975). See
also Comment, supra note 12, at 171-72.
The fact that a state may permissibly impose interest arbitration procedures upon
local governments does not, however, mean that in the absence of pre -emptive state
legislation such local entities are free to enact their own arbitration laws. If their gov-
ernmental enabling charter specifically directs local legislative bodies to determine
employment matters, an attempt by those bodies to redelegate that authority to outside
arbitrators may transcend the scope of their power. See Bagley v. City of Manhattan
Beach, 18 Cal. 3d 22, 553 P.2d 1140 (1976).
35 See City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290 (1975).
" City of Spokane v. Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 461, 553 P.2d 1316, 1319
(1976). See City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 41, 332 N.E.2d 290, 302
(1975) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
37 See generally H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK & C. CRAVER, supra note 2, at 612-17;
Staudohar, Constitutionality of Compulsory Arbitration Statutes in Public Employment, 27 LAB.
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Professor Summers previously has noted that "private employment collec-
tive bargaining is a process of private decisionmaking shaped primarily by
market forces, while in public employment it is a process of governmental
decisionmaking shaped ultimately by political forces." 38 When a public sec-
tor bargaining impasse is referred to arbitration for final resolution, the polit-
ical process could conceivably be distorted as private arbiters directly or indi-
rectly determine governmental priorities which are generally decided by
elected representatives." Nonetheless, "once a legislative judgment in favor
of binding arbitration has been made, that should be the overriding consider-
ation and should ordinarily dispose of the political distortion argument."
This sage opinion has, unfortunately, not always prevailed in the courts.
In recent years, only three state supreme courts have invalidated public
sector interest arbitration enactments based upon the notion that such laws
impermissibly delegate governmental power to private arbitrators." In City
of Sioux Falls v. Firefighters Local 814, 4' the South Dakota Supreme Court in-
validated the South Dakota Firemen's and Policemen's Arbitration Act, which
provided for the arbitral resolution of bargaining impasses, on the ground
that it constituted an inappropriate delegation of legislative authority to politi-
cally unaccountable arbiters. A similar conclusion was reached in Greeley Police
Union v. City Council,'" in which the Colorado Supreme Court. found uncon-
stitutional a city charter amendment which prescribed interest arbitration to
settle police negotiation impasses.'" This constitutional analysis was also
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City v. Firefighters," wherein
the court. succinctly summarized the ratio decedendi underlying this line of ju-
dicial precedent:
[T]he [Firefighters Negotiation] act authorizes the appointment of
arbitrators, who are private citizens with no responsibility to the pub-
lic, to make binding determinations affecting the quantity, quality,
and cost of art essential public service. The legislature may not sur-
render its legislative authority to a body wherein the public interest
LI 670 (1976); Weisberger, supra note 27; Note, Binding Interest Arbitration in the Pub-
lic Sector: Is It Constitutional?, 18 Wm. & 11:1ARY L. REV. 787, 797-81(1 (1977). See also
Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsmy Public-Sector Bargaining, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25,
103-12 (1974).
38
 Summers, Public Employer Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J.
1156 (1974).
a" See Morris, supra note 12, at 472. See also Grodin, supra note 7, at 681-82.
4 " Morris, supra note 12, at 473.
4 ' Although in Everett Fire Fighters v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 2c1 114, 278 P.2d
662 (1955), the Washington Supreme•Court had found a city charter initiative provi-
sion specifying the arbitral resolution of bargaining impasses to constitute an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power, it subsequently rejected this position when,
in City of Spokane v. Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976), it sus-
tained the propriety of a state interest arbitration statute covering uniformed person-
nel.
89 S.D. 455, 234 N.W.2d 35 (1975).
43
 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790 (1976).
44
 The Colorado Supreme Court reaffirmed its Greeley analysis in City of Au-
rora v. Firelighters Ass'n, 193 Colo. 437, 566 P.2d 1356 (1977).
45
 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977).
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is subjected to the interest of a group which may be antagonistic to
the public interest.
* * *
The power conferred on the panel of arbitrators is not consonant
with the concept of representative democracy. The political power,
which the people possess under [the state constitution], and which
they confer on their elected representatives is to be exercised by per-
sons responsible and accountable to the people—not independent of
them. The act is designed to insulate the decision-making process
and the results, from accountability within the political process;
therefore, it is not an appropriate means of resolving legislative-
political issues.'
The substantial majority of state supreme courts which have considered the
constitutional delegation issue have, however, rejected this rationale in favor
of one sustaining such enactments.
The fundamental constitutional question created by public sector interest
arbitration provisions concerns the fact that legislative authority is entrusted
to basically non-governmental individuals. It would be possible for a state to
avoid this legal morass by simply establishing a politically accountable adminis-
trative agency to resolve bargaining impasses. This alternative was accepted by
Nebraska through its creation of the Court of Industrial Relations. 47 It might
also be feasible to circumvent the constitutional dilemma by contending that
governmentally authorized private arbitrators effectively act as "public offi-
cials" when they perform their arbitral functions, thus rendering them "politi-
cally responsible." Although this semantical prestidigitation was accepted by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court as the basis for sustaining the constitutional-
ity of the Rhode Island Fire Fighters Arbitration Act," other courts have
quite properly refused to engage in such legal conjuration. They have thus
had to directly confront the basic delegation issue.
The prevailing contemporary judicial philosophy recognizes that, while
"purely legislative power cannot, be delegated, where a law embodies a
reasonably clear . policy or standard to guide and control administrative offi-
cers, so that the law takes effect by its own terms when the facts are ascer-
tained by the officers and not according to their whim, then the delegation of
power will be constitutional." 4" Public sector interest arbitration statutes usu-
4" 563 P.2d at 789, 790. See. Greeley Police Union v. City Council, 191 Colo. at
423. 553 P.2d at 792 (1976).
Although the statutes involved in the Sioux Falls and Salt Lake City cases provided
no specific standards to guide arbitrators when they were making their determinations,
neither decision indicated that this statutory omission meaningfully affected the resolu-
tion of the constitutionality issue.
" See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-801 to -838 (Sapp. 1978). The right of that ad-
ministrative tribunal to engage in interest arbitration is established in § 48-818 of that
enactment. This legislative option could be utilized in states which have found the use
of private interest arbitrators to he unconstitutional.
" See City of Warwick v. Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206
(1969).
4" City of Richfield v. Fire Fighters Local 1215, 	 Minn. 	 , 276 N.W.2d
42, 45 (1979). Accord, Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370
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ally satisfy this benchmark, since they primarily empower arbitrators merely to
determine the relevant factual circumstances surrounding bargaining disputes
and to interpret those facts in accordance with prescribed guidelines. Such
enactments do not delegate any power to make the law. The only authority
conferred is power to execute the law already determined and cir-
cumscribed.""
Although interest arbitrators are not directly accountable to the public,
appropriate statutory and judicial constraints adequately insure their compe-
tency and responsibility.''' Most interest arbitration enactments specifically
list factors which should be considered by arbiters when they are formulating
their decisions. 52 Some provide very detailed criteria, as does the Rhode Is-
land Policemen's Arbitration Act:
The factors, among others, to be given weight by the arbitrators in
arriving at a decision shall include:
(a) Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employ-
ment of the police department in question with prevailing wage
rates or hourly conditions of employment of skilled employees
of the building trades and industry in the local operating area
involved.
(b) Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employ-
ment of the police department in question with wage rates or
hourly conditions of employment of police departments in cities
or towns of comparable size.
Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976); State of Wyoming v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295
(Wyo. 1968); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2c1 560 (1969); City of Amsterdam
v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290 (1975); Division 540, Transit Union v.
Mercer Improvement Authority, 76 N.J. 245, 386 A.2d 1290 (1978); City of Spokane
v. Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2t1 457, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976); Firefighters v. City of Vallejo,
12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971 (1974); East Providence v. Firefighters, Local 850, 117
R.I. 329, 366 A.2d 1151 (1976).
5 ° State of Wyoming v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 301 (Wyo. 1968). In
addition to the cases cited in note 49 supra, see also City of Biddeford v. Teachers
Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973) and Fire Fighters v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229,
231 N.W.2d 226 (1975), wherein the constitutionality of state interest arbitration stat-
utes was sustained by equally divided courts. It is interesting to note that while the
equally divided City of Dearborn court upheld the propriety of arbitration panels ap-
pointed by the chair of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC), a
majority found invalid that portion of the enactment which authorized arbitration by
panels selected by the disputing parties themselves. The court believed that since the
MERC chair was appointed by the Governor, there was sufficient overall political ac-
countability regarding the selection of the arbitral panels, while this was not considered
present with respect to panels appointed through the alternative mechanism. This
would appear to Inc to be an artificial and rather meaningless distinction, since it is
naive to think that the Governor will really be held politically responsible for the re-
sults of an intemperate award emanating from an arbitral panel appointed by the chair
of MERC. if anything, the political repercussions would likely be greater where a local
municipality has consented to the selection of an irresponsible panel than if the panel
had been designated by a more distant, non-elected state official.
51 See City of Richfield v. Fire Fighters Local 1215, 	 Minn.	 276
N.W.2d 42, 47 (1979).
52 See generally McAvoy, supra note 12, at 1199-1201; Morris, supra note 12, at
469-71; Comment, supra note 12, at 180.
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(c) Interest and welfare of the public.
(d) Comparison of peculiarities of employment in regard to
other trades or professions, specifically:
(1) Hazards of employment
(2) Physical qualifications
(3) Educational qualifications
(4) Mental qualifications
(5) Job training and skills."
Other arbitration provisions are more general, as typified by the Minnesota
Employment Relations Act:
In considering a dispute and issuing its order the panel shall give
clue consideration to the statutory rights and obligations of public
employers [sic] to efficiently manage and conduct. its operations
within the legal limitations surrounding the financing of such opera-
tions. 54
However, a few statutes, such as the Pennsylvania Police—Firefighter Collec-
tive Bargaining Act,''' do not specify any particular standards which must be
weighed. Nevertheless, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appropriately rec-
ognized in Harney v. Russo," a statute is not unconstitutional merely because
of the absence of any specifically prescribed arbitral guidelines, for sufficient
guidance may readily be derived from the basic policies underlying the adop-
tion of the particular enactment in question and from the decisions issued by
arbitrators acting under similar laws.
An examination of the different criteria specified in the various statutes
indicates to those familiar with the interest arbitration process the fact that
most of the prescribed standards merely codify those factors which seasoned
arbiters would likely apply even if no legislative guidelines were provided."
This conclusion is substantiated by the fact that experiences with arbitral deci-
sions in Michigan and Pennsylvania have demonstrated no discernible differ-
ence between awards governed by detailed statutory standards and those not
regulated by any specified criteria." Furthermore, should an aberrational
decision ever be issued, the situation could be judicially rectified.
Courts sustaining the constitutionality of interest arbitration statutes have
generally stressed the importance of judicial review as a device to guarantee
substantive and procedural fairness:"
" R. I . GEN. Laws § 28-9.2-10 (1968).
54 MINN. STAT. ANN. § , 179.72(7) (Supp. 1978).
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.4 (Supp. 1978-79).
5"
 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969).
57 See Klapper, Legislated Criteria in Arbitration of Public Safety Contract Disputes,
29 ARB. J. 115, 116-18 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Klapper]. See also Grodin, supra
note 7, at 690-91.
58 See Klapper, supra note 57, at 116. See generally J. STERN ET AL., supra note
12.
59 See, e.g., Division 540, Transit Workers v. Mercer Improvement Authority,
76 N.J. 245, 252, 386 A.2d 1290, 1294 (1978). See generally cases cited at note 49 supra.
See also Note, Compulsory Arbitration: The Scope of Judicial ReOiew, 51 ST, JOHN'S L. REV.
604, 607-08 (1977) [hereinafter cited as St. John's Note]. But see City of Washington v.
Police Dep't, 436 Pa. 168, 172-73, 259 A.2d 437, 440 (1969).
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Even where judicial review is proscribed by statute, the courts have
the power and the duty to make certain that the administrative offi-
cial [i.e., the arbitrator] has not acted in excess of the grant of au-
thority given him by statute or in disregard of the standard pre-
scribed by the legislature.
* * *
Due process of law requires ... that the contract. imposed by the
arbitrator under the power conferred by statute have a basis not only
in his good faith, but in law and the record before him ...."
However, the extent of judicial review which should be available must be care-
fully determined. if judicial intervention were too readily permitted, the legis-
lative objective of providing an expeditious and final resolution of bargaining
impasses would be seriously compromised. On the other hand, if arbitral
awards were accorded excessive deference, the public interest could occasion-
ally be substantially prejudiced by intemperate arbitral action.
III. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION/REVIEW
Judicial involvement can occur either before or after an arbitration pro-
ceeding has been conducted. A pre-arbitration suit may contend that arbitra-
tion should be precluded on the ground that either the issues in dispute are
not subject to arbitration or the procedural prerequisites to arbitration have
not been satisfied."' Following the issuance of an award, judicial relief may
be sought on the ground that the arbitral decision is substantively or pro-
cedurally defective." 2
A. Pre-Arbitration Intervention
Courts have traditionally been hesitant to enforce private sector agree-
ments to resolve negotiation impasses through interest arbitration proce-
dures."' This predilection should not, however, adversely influence the will-
"" Mount St, Mary's Hospital v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 505, 507, 260
N.E.2d 508, 515 (1970). Accord, Division 540, Transit Workers v. Mercer Improvement
Authority, 76 N.J. 245, 252, 386 A.2d 1290, 1294 (1978); City of Providence v. Fire
Fighters, 111 R.I. 586, 590, 305 A.2d 93, 95 (1973).
'' Although these issues arc often presented in suits by public employers to
prevent arbitration being sought by workers, the same questions could also be raised
by governmental entities as defenses to actions commenced by representative labor
organizations to compel arbitration where such public agencies refuse to participate in
arbitral proceedings which cannot be unilaterally instituted by the unions themselves.
The methods discussed in this article to resolve the basic underlying issues apply
equally to both types of litigation.
62 Such relief could either be directly sought by a party dissatisfied with a
particular award or be precipitated by a public employer's refusal to comply com-
pletely with the results of an arbitral decision which would force the affected labor
organization to seek judicial enforcement of the award.
as See Friedman, Arbitration of Disputes Over New Labor Contract Terms, 15
W. RES. L. REV. 735, 750-52 (1964); Note, Court Enforcement of Arbitration: Provisions for
New Contracts, 10 B.C. IND. & Cont. L. REV. 159 (1968). See also Note, Federal Enforce-
ment of Agreements to Arbitrate New Contract Terms, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 284 (1957).
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ingness of judicial tribunals to sustain public sector interest arbitration,
because such proceedings, instead of being merely authorized by private parties,
are legislatively sanctified. Since such public sector enabling statutes unques-
tionably demonstrate governmental respect for the interest arbitration proc-
ess, pre-arbitration judicial intervention should be severely limited.
Where a public employer can indisputably demonstrate that an allegedly
applicable interest arbitration law does not actually cover the employees in-
volved in au existing bargaining dispute, it would not be inappropriate for a
court to grant the employer's request for an order precluding arbitration."
The legal question presented by such litigation would concern the legislative
intent underlying the statute in question, a matter peculiarly within the exper-
tise of judges. Furthermore, there would be little likelihood that the develop-
ment of an arbitral record would meaningfully assist a court with its decision.
A more difficult problem concerns the propriety of pre-arbitration judi-
cial intervention where a party contends that mandatory procedural pre-
requisites have not been satisfied. In City of Des Moines v. Public Employment
Relations Board, 45 the Iowa Supreme Court decided that since the legislative
history of the relevant statutory provisions clearly indicated that compulsory
arbitration could not be required following the passage of the established
budget submission date, there was no reason why an order prohibiting the
initiation of time-barred arbitration should not be issued. However, courts
must be careful to recognize that temporal limitations should not always be
accorded unquestioned deference. If a labor organization can demonstrate
that compliance with a statutory time scheme has been prevented by man-
agement's own dilatory tactics, the apparent statutory deficiency should gen-
erally be equitably excused.'''' The dilemma created by such similar, yet criti-
cally distinguishable situations, concerns the fact that during the judicial pro-
ceedings arbitration is usually not progressing. Since time is of the essence
with respect to the resolution of bargaining disputes and the prevention of
work stoppages which could be precipitated by worker frustration," such
pre-arbitration litigation should be handled in a most expeditious manner.
Furthermore, courts should unequivocally proclaim that arbitration will only
be precluded where an employer can convincingly establish that the legisla-
ture intended not to permit arbitral proceedings under the particular cir-
cumstances involved. This would beneficially indicate to recalcitrant gov-
ernmental entities the futility of using disingenuous pre-arbitration litigation
as a device to thwart the arbitration process.
The most difficult question which is likely to be presented to courts prior
to the commencement of arbitration concerns an allegation that a particular
bargaining topic is not subject to interest arbitration resolution. Most interest
64 See Detention Officers v. City of Lincoln Park, 76 Mich, App. 358, 256
N.W.2d 593 (1977) (police/firefighter arbitration act not applicable to detention offi-
cers).
65
 275 N.W.2d 753 (Iowa 1979).
66 See Firefighters Local 463 v. City of Johnstown, 468 Pa. 96, 360 A.2d 197
(1976).
67 See Grodin, supra note 7, at 699.
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arbitration legislation assumes that the scope of arbitrai coverage is congruent
with the scope of bargaining, thus restricting arbitral authority to mandatory
subjects for negotiation." The dilemma created by a claim that a disputed
matter does not constitute a mandatory bargaining topic involves the fact that
the distinction between obligatory wages, hours, and working conditions and
merely permissible managerial prerogatives is often quite nebulous.
The preferable procedure for resolving questions pertaining to the arbi-
tral propriety of particular impasse items has been recognized by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court:
Given the parties' divergent characterizations of the instant man-
power proposal, either one of which may well be accurate, we believe
the proper course must be to submit the issue to the arbitrators so
that a factual record may be established. The nature of the evidence
presented to the arbitrators should largely disclose whether the
manpower issue primarily involves the workload and safety of the
men ("wages, hours, and working conditions") or the policy of fire
prevention of the city ("merits, necessity or organization of any gov-
ernmental service" [management prerogatives]).''•
This method would prevent any prejudice which would result to employees
from a delay of the arbitral process during the judicial determination of the
negotiability question, yet it would not detrimentally affect public employers
since "after an arbitration decision has been rendered, judicial review is avail-
able to determine whether the arbitrators have exceeded their powers.""
B. Post-Arbitration Review
For many years, the national labor policy has recognized the exalted
status of private sector grievance arbitration procedures by permitting strictly
limited judicial review of awards emanating from such contractual dispute res-
olution schemes. So long as a grievance decision "draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement," it is entitled to judicial respect.n As Justice
Douglas observed:
[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construe- •
" 8 See id. at 695; School Committee, Town of Winslow v. Education Ass'n, 363
A.2d 229 (Me. 1976).
Where parties have themselves voluntarily agreed to more expansive arbitration of
bargaining impasses covering all items in dispute, permissive, as well as mandatory,
topics may be subject to arbitral jurisdiction. See Boston School Committee v. Teachers
Local 66, 372 Mass. 605, 363 N.E.2d 485 (1977).
"" Fire Fighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 620-21, 526 P.2d
971, 979 (1974).
" Id., 12 Cal. 3d at 615 n.6, 526 P.2d at 976 n.6. The portions of the
challenged arbitration award pertaining to concededly mandatory bargaining top-
ics could then be immediately effectuated, while only those parts covering allegedly
non-obligatory items would be held in abeyance during the judicial review process. See
also Sheriffs' Ass'n v, Milwaukee County, 64 Wis. 2d 651, 221 N.W.2d 673 (1974).
71 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel Sc Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
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tion which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision
concerns construction of the contract., the courts have no business
overruling him because their interpretation is different from his."
One might logically argue that the need for arbitral finality unfettered by
time-consuming judicial involvement should support the adoption of this re-
strictive review standard for public sector interest arbitration. However, criti-
cal differences between grievance arbitration and interest arbitration militate
in favor of a somewhat stricter standard of judicial review pertaining to in-
terest arbitration awards.
Grievance arbitration generally results from the voluntary agreement of
the parties involved, while public sector interest arbitration is usually statuto-
rily imposed, not infrequently upon unenthusiastic governmental employers.
Another critical distinction concerns the fact that a grievance arbitrator is
merely authorized to interpret and apply the express terms of an existing
contract, while an interest arbitrator is empowered to formulate the actual
employment terms which will govern the parties' relationship during the life
of the resulting agreement." Although the grievance arbitrator's discretion is
delineated by the terms of the relevant bargaining agreement, the interest
arbitrator possesses wide latitude to recommend whatever final resolution
seems appropriate. As a result of the discretionary freedom enjoyed by in-
terest arbiters, aberrational decisions may occasionally be produced which re-
flect neither the desires of the parties nor the realities of the pertinent
employment fnarket. 74 To preclude the effectuation of such deviant awards,
some meaningful judicial review must he available.
Some public sector interest arbitration statutes specifically define the
scope of judicial review to be applied to arbitral decisions, while most enact-
ments are either silent with respect to this subject or they provide no really
definitive standards.'" Where express review criteria are legislatively pre-
scribed,'" courts are generally apprised of the reviewing function they are
72 Id. at 599. "A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award, which
permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a
reason for refusing to enforce the award. Arbitrators have no obligation to the court
to give their reasons for an award." Id. at 598. See generally Comment, Judicial Enforce-
ment of Labor Arbitrators' Awards, 114 U. PA. REV. 1050 (1966).
7 " See Overton, Criteria in Grievance and Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 28
ARB. J. 159, 161-63 (1973); Recent Development, Judicial Enforcement of Contract-
Arbitration Agreements, 21 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675 (1969). See also Mironi, The Functional
Approach to Judicial Oversight of Specialized Tribunals—A Case Study, 52 N.Y.U. L. RE.v.
745, 789-91 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mironi]. But cf. Fleming, Interest Arbitration
Revisited, 7 J. LAW Rice. 1 (1973).
" See Columbia Note, supra note 7, at 526. But cf. Howlett, supra note 22, at
64.
75 See McAvoy, supra note 12, at 1204; Morris, supra note 12, at 492-93; St.
John's Note, supra note 59, at 618-24.
7 '' For example, The Connecticut Municipal Employee Relations Act, Comsr.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473c(c)(3) (Stipp. 1978), provides that the relevant provisions of
the Connecticut General Arbitration Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-408 to -424
(Supp. 1978), shall govern the judicial review of interest arbitration decisions. The
criteria for vacating an award are defined in § 52-418:
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expected to perform." However, in the many jurisdictions where no de-
lineated guidelines are articulated, judges are required to develop their own
standards of review.
If courts so narrowly restrict their review function that they effectively
provide arbitral determinations with almost total deference, there exists the
possibility of catastrophic consequences resulting from an entirely intemperate
award. 78
 Conversely, if judicial intervention is liberally countenanced, one of
the fundamental objectives underlying interest arbitration enactments, the ex-
peditious and final resolution of bargaining disputes, may be substantially
compromised." The challenge is to apply standards of review that will dis-
courage frivolous appeals which only delay the impasse resolution process,
while simultaneously permitting judicial intervention in those occasional situa-
tions where corrective action is warranted.
Judicial tribunals could analogize their interest arbitration review function
to that performed with respect to grievance arbitration awards 8" or to the
(a) if the award shall have been procured by corruption, fraud or undue
means; (b) if' there shall have been evident partiality or corruption on the
part of the arbitrators or either of' them; (c) if the arbitrators shall have
been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon suffi-
cient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy Or of any other action by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced; (d) if' the arbitrators shall have exceeded their pow-
ers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award
upon the subject-matter submitted was not made.
The grounds for modifying an award arc stated in § 52-419:
(a) If' there shall have been an evident material miscalculation of figures or
au evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing or
property referred to in the award; (h) if the arbitrators shall have awarded
upon a matter not submitted to them unless it be a matter not affecting the
merits of the decision upon the matters submitted; (c) if' the award shall be
imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.
Compare the Michigan Policemen's and Firemen's Arbitration Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 423.242 (Supp. 1978-79), which permits judicial review only for reasons that
the arbitration panel was without or exceeded its jurisdiction; the order is unsupported
by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record; or the order was
procured by fraud, collusion or other similar and unlawful means."
77
 Even where specific standards are statutorily prescribed, sufficient latitude
usually exists to provide reviewing courts with significant discretion.
78 Cf. St. John's Note, supra note 59, at 630 (effective judicial review urged).
79 See Anderson, Compulsory Arbitration Under State Statutes in PROCEEDINGS OF
22D ANN. N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 259, 279-80 (T. Christensen ed. 1970); Mironi,
supra note 73, tit 803-04.
" See Joint School Dist. v. Education Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2c1 94, 253 N.W.2c1 536
(1977), wherein the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
The decision of an arbitrator cannot be interfered with for mere error of
judgment as to law or fact. Courts will overturn an arbitrator's award if
there is a perverse misconstruction [of the contract] or if' there is a positive
misconduct plainly established, or if there is a manifest disregard of the
law, or if the award itself is illegal or violates strong public policy.
Id. at 117-18, 253 N.W.2c1 at 547. See generally Craver, The Judicial Enforcement of Public
Sector Grievance Arbitration, 58 TEXAS L. REv. 329 (1980).
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more involved role they discharge concerning administrative decision-
making!" They could alternatively recognize the relatively unique nature of
public sector interest arbitration and endeavor to develop novel guidelines
specifically suited to the particular objectives sought to be achieved." Thus
far, however, no single approach has been uniformly accepted.
Although it is established that the burden of persuasion rests upon those
parties challenging arbitral decisions, 83 courts do MA always agree upon the
exact review procedures to be followed. Some courts compare the interest.
arbitration process with quasi-legislative administrative action and thus decide
that it is proper to utilize the same basic procedures which pertain to the
review of regular administrative adjudications." However, they reasonably
modify the usual administrative review process by requiring the disputing par-
ties, and not the arbitral body, to litigate the appeal. Other courts reject this
approach. They instead focus upon the fact that administrative review provi-
sions literally direct the challenged adjudicatory entity to formally defend its
position in court. To avoid the adverse impact which would clearly result. if
private interest arbitrators were forced to become involved in such frequently
protracted and expensive proceedings, these courts find it preferable to sim-
ply follow the review procedures applied to grievance arbitration cases. 83
Nonetheless, since the two alternative methods accepted for appeals from ar-
bitral determinations require only the directly interested disputants to partici-
pate, it is readily apparent. that their procedural differences are more theoret-
ical than real.
Even though courts do not uniformly agree upon the semantical label to
be attached to judicial review proceedings emanating from public sector in-
terest arbitration awards, they are quite consistent with respect. to the substan-
tive standards of review to be applied to such awards. No interest arbitration
decision procured by fraudulent or corrupt means is entitled to judicial accept-
ance. 86 However, the mere allegation of arbitral misconduct does not au-
tomatically preclude enforcement of the challenged award. The claimed
81 With respect to judicial review of administrative decisions, see generally
Jaffe, judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record, - 64 HARV. L. REV. 1233
(1951); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
a ' See Mironi„wpra note 73, at 746-47; Weisberger, supra note 27, at 41-43.
83 See, e.g., Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 159, 359 N.E.2d 683, 687 (1976).
84 See, e.g., Maquoketa Valley Community School Dist. v. Education Ass'n, 279
N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1979). Cf. City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, N.Y.2d 19, 38-39, 332
N.E.2d 290, 300-01 (1975) (Fucffsberg, j., concurring) (indicating that classification of"
arbitral function as legislative, judicial, or administrative should not be critical factor
regarding appropriate standard of review).
85 See, e.g., Cast) v. Coffey. 41 N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d 683 (1976).
85 Cf. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Fennie, 383 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co.
1976), aff'd, 391 N.Y.S.2d 227 (App. Div. 1977), wherein the court vacated a 2-1 arbi-
tration award where the majority consisted of the union and police department rep-
resentatives and it was established that the employer representative, who was then the
city safety commissioner, had shifted his loyalty prior to the award from the police
department to the union, following an intervening mayoral election, since he knew
that he would no longer be retained as safety commissioner but would instead he
returning to his former position as police captain.
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transgression must. be clearly established. Additionally, it must be dem-
onstrated convincingly that the questioned behavior actually influenced the
decision. 8 7
Where all or part" of an arbitral order is procedurally or substantively
defective, judicial intervention is usually obtainable. Therefore, if an arbitra-
tion statute specifically mandates the issuance of decisions within a certain
number of days following the commencement or termination of the eviden-
tiary hearings, any opinion rendered after the expiration of the requisite time
limit would likely be denied enforcement. 89 judicial tribunals similarly re-
spect express legislative restrictions imposed upon arbitral authority. For
example, where an enactment specifically precludes the issuance of arbitral
directives operating beyond a certain time period, any order obligating a pub-
lic employer for a longer duration would be curtailed. 9° An analogous result
would probably be achieved if an arbiter, who possessed only the power to
render an award effective prospectively, announced an award requiring
retroactive application."
Even where no explicit legislative provisions limit the authority of arbi-
trators, courts do not sustain arbitral directives which require the perform-
ance of improper acts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed:
In spite of the fact that neither the relevant constitutional provisions
nor the enabling legislation clearly delineates the power of arbitra-
tion panels, we are of the opinion that such panels may not mandate
that a governing body carry out an illegal act. We reach this result by
quite frankly reading into the enabling legislation the requirement
that the scope of submission to the arbitrators be limited to conflicts
" 7 See City of Manitowoc v. Police Dep't, 70 Wis. 2d 1006, 1019-20, 236
N.W.2d 231, 239 (1975); Firefighters Local 1296 v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wash. 2d
156, 162, 542 P.2d 1252, 1256 (1975). These decisions recognized that mere contact.
between the arbitrator and one party under circumstances creating the impression of
possible impropriety did not require vacation of the award where no inappropriate
influence was substantiated.
88
 If only part of an arbitral decision is unenforceable, the remaining portion
of the award will usually be left intact by the reviewing court, so lopg as it appears that
the invalid part did not impermissibly taint the other sections. See. Firefighters Local
1714 v. City of Marlborough, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1820, 1822-30, 378 N.E.2d 437,
439-41 (1978). See also Firefighters Local 1347 v. Town of Watertown, 1978 Mass.
Adv. Sh. 2956, 2967-69, 383 N.E.2d 494, 500 (1978). Where evidence indicates that
the improper part of a decision may have affected the other recommendations, the
court should, if possible, remand the case to the arbitrator for reconsideration.
8" See Maquoketa Valley Community School Dist. v. Education Ass'n, 279
N.W.2d 510 (1979). If such a time limitation were found to be merely suggestive in-
stead of mandatory, a belated award would probably be enforceable, except perhaps
where undue prejudice to one of the parties had been caused by the delay.
"" See Town of Tiverton v. Lodge 23, 118 R.I. 160, 372 A.2d 1273 (1977);
East Providence v. Firefighters Local 850, 117 R.I. 329, 339-40. 366 A.2d 1151, 1157
(1976).
° See Council 23, AFSCME v. Board of Comm'rs, 86 Mich. App. 453, 272
N.W.2d 681 (1978). But ef. Crete Education Ass'n v. School Dist., 193 Neb. 245, 226
N.W.2d 752 (1975) (upholding effectively retroactive decision of Court of Industrial
Relations despite proscription against retroactive orders).
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over legitimate terms and conditions of employment.... [A]n arbi-
tration award may only require a public employer to do that which it
could do voluntarily."'
This judicial doctrine does not, however, permit. recalcitrant governmental en-
tities to circumvent their labor obligations through the enactment of self-
imposed legal restrictions. Thus, as the Pennsylvania court noted:
An arbitration award which deals only with proper terms and condi-
tions of employment serves as a mandate to the legislative branch of
the public employer, and if the terms of the award require affirma-
tive action on the part of the Legislature, then they must take such
action, if it is within their power to do so."
The most delicate issue which regularly confronts courts concerns the de-
gree of judicial review to be imposed upon the discretionary evaluations made
by interest arbitrators. Courts appropriately recognize that such arbitral tri-
bunals do perform quasi-legislative functions, since they dictate the terms of
employment. which must be adopted by the relevant legislative bodies, and
they reasonably extrapolate from their extensive experience pertaining to the
review of administrative adjudications.
Factual determinations that are rationally supported by the evidentiary
record are usually confirmed. In the words of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court:
[T]he only question ... is whether the [arbitration] board has abused
its discretion. In making this determination, we do not weigh evi-
dence or act as factfinders. All we shall do is to examine the record
made before the board to determine whether it contains any compe-
tent evidence that would support the board's action.'
While the adoption of this objective standard is certainly proper, circumspec-
tion must be maintained in specific cases to insure that questionable factual
determinations are not perfunctorily accepted by overly deferential judges.
Because of the significant impact upon the general public which could result
from an intemperate arbitral decision, a court should cautiously examine the
entire record before confirming a challenged factual conclusion. Even though
a court should never simply substitute its assessment of the factual record for
that of the arbitrator, since the legislature has designed that individual as the
" 2 City of Washington v. Police Dep't, 436 Pa. 168, 176-77, 259 A.2d 437, 442
(1969). Accord, Firefighters Local 1347 v. Town of Watertown, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh.
2956, 383 N.E.2d 494 (1978); Conley v. Joyce, 482 Pa. 263, 393 A.2d 654 (1978);
School Comm., Town of Winslow v. Education Ass'n, 363 A.2d 229 (Me. 1976).
" City of Washington v. Police Dep't, 436 Pa. 168, 177, 259 A.2d 437, 442
(1969).
" City of Cranston v. Hall, 118 R.I. 20, 28, 371 A.2d 590, 594 (1977). Accord,
Firefighters Local 1714 v. City of Marlborough, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1820, 1827-30,
378 N.E.2d 437, 441 (1978). Regarding the frequently followed federal standard of
review, see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 480-90 (1951). See gener-
ally Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 HARV. L. REV.
1233 (1951). See also Grodin, supra note 7, at 698-99.
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person who is to make the necessary factual evaluations, a reviewing tribunal
should not hesitate to vacate arbitral findings which are unquestionably con-
trary to the evidentiary record."`'
Arbitral awards that have a reasonable foundation in the statutorily pre-
scribed or judicially developed interpretive criteria" are usually accorded ju-
dicial deference:
["The presence of evidence pertaining to any or all of the specific
criteria which are to be "considered" is a factor to be taken into ac-
count when determining whether the award itself is founded on a
rational basis ... An award may be found on review to be rational if'
any basis for such a conclusion is apparent to the court ... And it.
need only appear from the decision of the arbitrators that the
criteria specified in the statute were "considered" in good faith and
that the resulting award has a "plausible basis"...." 7
It is thus quite unusual for a reviewing court. to interpose its judgment fc.u-
that of an interest arbitrator."
Where a court is asked to ascertain whether an interest arbitration award
has correctly explicated the applicable interpretive criteria and properly
applied them to the underlying factual determinations, it. should scrutinize the
arbitral opinion to insure the presence of a rational foundation.`"' If perti-
"5 See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474. 490 (1951).
"" Where a statute provides a detailed set of criteria to guide interest arbi-
trators, it is possible that some courts will decline to impose any additional factors on
the ground that "'where a statute or ordinance enumerates the things upon which it is
to operate, ... it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly
mentioned, unless the legislative body has plainly indicated a contrary purpose or in-
tention.... Nebraska City Education Ass'n v. School Dist., 201 Neb. 303, 306, 267
,N.W.2d 530, 532 (1978). This analysis is certainly cogent where the legislature has
expressly indicated its desire to limit the interpretive criteria to those enumerated in
the enactment. However, this intention should not be presumed simply from a
statutorily prescribed list of standards, particularly where the provided factors are of a
typically general nature. If it is not readily apparent that the legislative body intended
that the statutory criteria be exclusive, courts should be willing to develop such addi-
tional guidelines as are consistent with those specified in the law.
Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 158, 359 N.E.2d 683, 686-87 (1976). Accord,
Firefighters Local 1714 v. City of Marlborough, 1978 Mass, Ads'. Sh, 1820, 1827-30,
378 N.E.2d 437, 441 (1978); City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo, 41 N.Y.2d 764, 767, 364
N.E.2d 817, 819 (1977); City of Manitowoc v. Police Depi, 70 Wis. 2d 1006, 1016-18,
236 N.W.2d 231, 237-38 (1975).
" 14
 It is interesting to note that in Nebraska, where the Court of Industrial
Relations, instead of private arbitrators, is utilized to resolve public sector bargaining
disputes, there has been a somewhat greater tendency for reviewing courts to re-
examine final determinations than there has been in other stales using the services of
private arbiters. See Firefighters Local 644 v. City of Lincoln, 198 Neb. 174, 252
N.W.2d 607 (1977). But cf. Omaha Ass'n of Firelighters v. City of Omaha, 194 Neb.
436, 231 N.W.2d 710 (1975) and Crete Education Ass'n v. School Dist., 193 Neb. 245,
226 N.W.2d 752 (1975) (substantial deference given to determinations made by the
Court of Industrial Relations).
"" One court has indicated that it will not always require interest arbitrators to
provide written decisions which explicate the rationale underlying the resulting award.
See City of Manitowoc v. Police Dcp't, 70 Wis. 2d 1006, 1017, 236 N.W.2d 231, 237-38
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nent guidelines have been impermissibly ignored or have been interpreted in
an unequivocally incorrect manner, the award should be vacated. Further-
more, while a court should not reject arbitral recommendations simply be-
cause it would not have reached the same conclusions had it been the original
arbiter, it should not sustain an award that has applied the relevant criteria to
the pertinent facts in an entirely irrational manner. 10"
Judges reviewing interest arbitration decisions are endeavoring to main-
tain a precarious balance. They properly recognize that they must not imper-
missibly usurp the authority of the arbitrator by injudiciously interfering with
that person's conclusions. They conversely realize that they should not abdi-
cate their judicial obligation by providing arbitral determinations with undue
deference. As long as this equilibrium continues to be maintained, the arbitra-
tion process and the public interest should appropriately be protected.
IV. CONCLUSION
In recent years, many states have adopted interest arbitration statutes as a
means to resolve public sector bargaining disputes.. Although a few courts
have found that such enactments unconstitutionally delegate legislative au-
thority to politically unaccountable private individuals, most have reasonably
recognized the validity of such legislation where appropriate statutory or judi-
cial guidelines circumscribe the discretion vested in such neutrals and their
final awards are subject to judicial scrutiny.
Reviewing courts generally accept factual determinations made by interest
arbitrators if they are supported by substantial evidence on the whole record.
The recommendations culminating from the application of the relevant
criteria to such factual findings are accorded similar judicial deference when
they have a rational foundation. However, where an arbitral decision does not
satisfy these prerequisites, courts quite properly decline to enforce them. Ar-
bitrators are thus provided with the latitude they need to perform their func-
tion, and the public is protected from the consequences of completely aberra-
tional awards.
(1975). However, other judicial tribunals have quite reasonably been reluctant to
countenance such a practice.
[Al decision, at least where the evidence is conflicting, must be factual as
well as conclusional, must contain a statement of the reasons and the
grounds upon which it is predicated, and must point out the evidence
upon which the ultimate findings rest.
City of Cranston v. Hall, 116 R.I. 183, 187, 354 A.2d 415, 418 (1976). Even though a
written decision does not necessarily express the actual reasons for the arbitrator's
recommendations, that adjudicator should at least be forced to think through the case
utilizing the applicable guidelines. This would require the arbiter to properly substan-
tiate the award, and it is the only way in which meaningful judicial review can be
preserved.
10" Where a reviewing court vacates a discretionary finding or recommendation
contained in an arbitral award, it should, if possible, remand the case to the arbitrator
for reconsideration of the relevant portion of the award. Such a re-evaluation should
not be initially undertaken by the court, since it is not the party designated by the
legislature to make such determinations. The other non-tainted parts of the award
should, of course, be immediately enforced by the court.
